FEDERAL COURT APPLICATION OF THE "DOING
BUSINESS" TEST IN DIVERSITY CASES

T

in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins' has compelled the federal courts to determine whether state or federal law should be decisive
of certain issues. One such issue which has caused particular difficulty
in this respect concerns the amenability of a foreign corporation to the
process of a federal district court. Obviously, in states with a test for
"doing business ' 2 different from the federal test, 3 the validity of service
E
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U.S. 64 (1938).

2 See, note 5 DUKE B.J. 137 (19SS) for a discussion of the various tests used by
the courts to determine amenability of a non-resident to service of process.
' Since the decision in InternationalShoe Co. 'o. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ,
thirty-two state courts have considered the applicability of the new federal "doing business" test; a majority of these courts have followed the liberal view therein announced.
Boyd v. Warren Paint & Color Co., 254 Ala. 686, 49 So.2d 559 (195o) ; Duraladd
Products Corp. v. Superior Court, 285 P.2d 699 (Cal. 1955) ; Klein v. Sunbeam Corp.
8 Terry 526, 94 A.2d 385 (Del. 1952) ; District Grocery Stores, Inc. v. Brunswick
Quick Freeze Co., io6 A.2d 134 (D.C. 1954) ; State v. Harrison, 74 So.ad 371 (Fla.
1954) ; Compania De Astral, S.A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357
(954); Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.ad 907 (953) ;
Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W.2d 451 (x947)5 Suits v. Old
Equity Life Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 483, 85 S.E.ad 602 (1955) 5 Grace v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 95 N.H. 74, 57 A.2d 619 (1948); S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co.,
277 P.zd 655 (Okla. 1954)i State v. Ford Motor Co., 208 S.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 242
(1946); McDaniel v. Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, 36 Tenn.App. 236,
254 S.W.2d x (1952) i James v. Consolidated Steel Corp., 595 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ.
App. 1946) ; Eure v. Morgan Jones & Co., 195 Va. 678, 79 S.E.2d 862 (1954); Smyth
v. Twin State Improvement Corp., ss6 Vt. 569, 8o A.2d 664 (1951); Thys v. State,
31 Wash.2d 739, 199 P.2d 68 (948).

Other states have not expressly accepted the International Shoe decision, frequently
because it would make no change in their definition of doing business. See Rodgers v.
Howard, 215 Ark. 43, 219 S.W.2d 240 (1949), but see Gillioz v. Kincannon, 213 Ark.
1010, 214 S.W.zd 212 (1948), and American Farmers Ins. Co. v. Thomason, 217 Ark.
705, 234 S.W.2d 37 (1950) (dissenting opinion) ; Travis v. Fuqua, 171 Ind.App. 440,
97 N.E.ad 867 (1951) i James v. Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry., 31o Ky. 616, 221 S.W.ad

449 0949) i Johnson v. El Dorado Creosoting Co., 71 So.ad 613 (La. 1954 ) 5 Jet Mfg.
Co. v. Sanford Ink Co., 330 Mass. 173, 112 N.E.2d (1952); Hershel Radio Co.
Dillon v. Allenv. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 Mich. 148, 54 N.W.zd 286 (1952)
Parker Co., 78 So.2d 357 (Miss. 1955). Contra: Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner,
210 Miss. 863, 5o So.2d 61 5 (1951); American Casualty Co. v. Kincade, 219 Miss. 653,
69 So.ad 820 (1954); A.&M. Trading Corp. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 13 N.J. 516,
oo A.zd 513 (1953). Compare Halloran y. Haffner, z5 N.J. Super. 241, 95 A.zd 921
(1953); Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N.Y. 529, 58 N.E.2d 719 (944).

Four states have expressly refused to accept the federal test.

Perkins v. Benguet
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of process could depend on whether the federal or state rule was applied.' The circuits, though divided,5 have leaned perceptibly toward
applying state definitions of "doing business."'
In Riverbank Laboratories v. Hardwood Produects Corp.,7 for example, an Illinois plaintiff instituted an action for unfair competition
against a Wisconsin corporation which was not licensed to do business
in Illinois, but was engaging in certain activity there.' The Illinois
Consolidated Mining Co., 155 Ohio St. 1x6, 98 N.E.2d 33 (1951), revad, 342 U.s. 437
(1952) ; Pellegrini v. Roux Distributing Co., 170 Pa. Super. 68, 84 A.2d Z22 (1951) ;
Lutz v. Foster & Kester Co., 367 Pa.'xz5, 79 A.2d 222 (i95i) ; Western Gas Appliances, Inc. v. Servel, Inc., 257 P.2d 950 (Utah '953).
' The extent to which itis incumbent upon the state courts to apply the federal test
has received varied treatment. Judge Goodrich stated that as a result of the new federal
test "the constitutional limitations on jurisdiction over a foreign corporation are not
as strict as they were once thought to be. The consequence . . . is that it might be
possible to extend . . . [the present state laws] to some instances where the courts of
that state have previously interpreted it to be inapplicable . . . [but] it is the business
of the federal court to follow the state court's construction . . . until [it] announces a
different rule." Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 17o F.2d 193, 195 (st Cir.
i948). "The broadest concept of doing business . . . does not automatically broaden
state definitions of doing business. It merely permits such enlargement." Ackerley v.
Commercial Credit Co., iii F. Supp. 92, 98 (D.N.J. 1953). But some state courts
feel bound by the International Shoe precedent. See State v. Harrison, 74 So.ad 371
(Fla. 1954)5 Schilling v. Roux Distributing Co., 240 Minn. 71, 59 N.W.2d 907
(953); Davis-Wood Lumber Co. v. Ladner, 210 Miss. 863, 50 So.2d 615 (1951);
Wooster v. Trimont Mfg. Co., 356 Mo. 682, 203 S.W.zd 411 (194.7); Grace v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 95 N.H. 74, 57 A.ad 619 (948).
' The split in the federal decisions has been widened by a distinction drawn between
cases originally brought in the federal courts and cases brought in the state courts and
later removed to the federal level. Professor Moore has rejected this distinction, flatly
asserting that federal courts should exercise an independent judgment, both in actions
originally instituted in the federal courts and in removed actions, concerning the validity
of the service of process. 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.25 (2d ed. 1948). For
an excellent classification of the cases see, Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp.
838, 845 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
' Many courts, however, have not even adverted to the problem. "Of the vast number of cases in the federal courts that have considered the problem of doing business,
[since Erie v. Tompkins] probably the majority of the cases have launched into a discussion as to whether the foreign corporation was doing business in the state without
consideration as to whether state or 'general' federal law should be applied to the
problem ...." Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838, 844 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
220 F.2d 465 ( 7 th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 308z (U.S. Oct. is,
1955) (No. 66).
'As shown by depositions taken, the defendant bore all the expenses of maintaining
a Chicago office, through which solicitations of orders were made. Defendant had its
corporate name on the office door, and was listed in the Chicago telephone directory and
in the office building lobby. Defendant shippped merchandise from Wisconsin into
"llinois continuously over a long period of years in amounts exceeding $xoo,ooo an-
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district court granted plaintiff a temporary injunction.9

But the court

of appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed on jurisdictional grounds,10
holding that state rather than federal law should determine whether a
foreign corporation was "doing business" within the state.
Generally, courts have taken one of two approaches to the cases.
On the one hand, some have relied upon Rule 4(d) (7)of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the process of a federal
district court shall be served upon foreign corporations "in the manner
prescribed by the law of the state."" This language, of itself, is said
to be broad enough to require the application of state law to determine
12
the amenability of a foreign corporation to a district court's process.
It is quite apparent from the context of Rule 4(d)(7), however, that
the phrase should not have that effect.' 3 Imparting to these words a
nually, and it had paid license royalties for the use of plaintiff's trade name, prior to its
expiration, of over $3,000 per month. In addition, defendant had made written agreements with other Illinois corporations for installation of its products. Its office manager
investigated complaints, all relating to the installation and servicing of the defendant's
product in the Illinois area.
' Injunctive relief is the appropriate remedy for a corporation in Illinois where
another has made exploitive use of its corporate name. Baldassano v. Accettura, 336
Ill.App. 445, 84. N.E.zd 336 (1949). See ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 134, § 13404(a) (Jones
Supp. 1953).
10 22o F.2d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 1955).
The court speaks interms of "venue"
when it refers to service of process to gain "jurisdiction."

" FED. R. Civ. P.4 (d)(7 )"The argument that the word

C"manner"

used inFederal Rule 4(d) (7) also in-

Nardis Sportswear,
cludes a states concept of "doing business" was adopted in Bomze v,.
Inc. 165 F.zd 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1948) (opinion by Judge Learned Hand), and in Pulson
v. A4merican Rolling Mill Co., 17o F.zd 193, 194 (st Cir. 1948) (opinion by Judge
Goodrich). However, the rule in the Bognze case, supra, was limited by one court to
removal cases, since the language of the decision "seems to imply that New York decisions are not relevant when a case is initiated in a federal court." Satterfield v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co., 128 F. Supp. 669, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Nevertheless, a line of decisions has developed since the Bomze-Pulson rationale was announced, in which the
"same concept used by Judge Goodrich [and Judge Learned Hand] has been relied
upon." Kenny v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 838, 844- (S.D. Cal. 1955).
Cases supporting this view include: Roberts v. Evans Case Co., 218 F.zd 893, 895 ( 7 th
Cir. x955) ; Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 2iz F.zd 147,
153 (sth Cir. 1954) ; Schmidt v. Esquire, Inc., 21o F.2d 908, 9z5 (7th Cir. 1954)5
Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.zd 541 ( 3 d Cir. 1953) (opinion by Judge
Goodrich). In a concurring opinion in the Partin case, Judge Biggs stated that "it is
not apparent whether the [majority] decision is based on a construction of [ 4 (d) (7)]
providing, inter alia, for a method of service of process under state practice, or strictly
on the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." Id. at 545.
"1For an examination of the difficulties that might arise if Rule 4 (d) (7) is as broad
as these authorities contend, see Note, 30 IND. L.J. 324, 330 et seq. (1955).
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jurisdictional meaning would be attributing an undue significance to a
rule which was clearly intended to regulate only the more mechanical
4
aspects of actual service of process.'
On the other hand, the majority of federal courts, in determining
which law should apply, have followed the familiar "substance-procedure" analysis of the Erie decision.' It is seldom, however, that the
courts have supported their conclusions by more than a superficial
examination of the problem."0 The conflict in the decisions is further
aggravated by the fact that plausible arguments can be developed on
both sides.
' That the intended breadth of the word "manner" as used in Federal Rule 4(d) (7)
is restricted to the mechanics of process is emphasized by a comparison of that particular
section with other provisions contained in the entire Rule 4. See: Scholnik v. National
Airlines, Inc. 219 F.2d 115, 12o (6th Cir. 1955); Gravely Motor Plow & Cultivator
Co. v. H. V. Carter Co., 193 F.2d 158, 159 (gth Cir. x95i); Kenny v. Alaska Airlines,
132 F. Supp. 838, 843 (S.D. Cal. 1955) ; Harris v. Deere & Co., 128 F. Supp. 799, 8o2

(E.D.N.C. 1955) 5 West v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co., ioS F. Supp.

276, 278

(E.D. Tenn. 1952); Allegue v. Gulf & South American S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 34, 35
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Moore v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 98 F. Supp. 375, 378 (E.D.
Pa. i95i); Hall v. Gulf South Utilities, 96 F. Supp. 351, 353 (S.D. Miss. 1951).

Favell-Utley Realty Co. v. Harbor Plywood Corp., 94 F. Supp. 96, 97 (N.D. Cal.
1950) ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE (zd ed. 1948) compare
4.18 with 4.42.
" The Erie mandate requires matters of substantive law in the federal courts to be
based upon state law, reserving procedural matters for the federal courts.
"6For example, see Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 212
F.2d 147, 153 (Sth Cir. 1954 ) ; Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.zd 68x,
68z (ioth Cir. 1949). Similarly, the courts that have applied federal law have done
so without real analysis. Professor Moore contends that "[w]hether a foreign corporation or other business is doing business in a state is a matter of general, not local,
law." 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 4..25 (2d ed. 1948), and cases cited. Accord:
French v. Gibbs Corp., 189 F.2d 787 (zd Cir. 195i) ; Satterfield v. Lehigh Valley R.R.
Co., x28 F. Supp. 669, 67o-671 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), and cases cited therein; Nyberg v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 123 F. Supp. 599, 6o2 (W.D. Mich. 1954); Ackerly v.
Commercial Credit Co., iii F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1953); Pike v. New England Greyhound Lines, 93 F. Supp. 669, 671 (D. Mass. 195o); Leakley v. Canadian Pacific
Express Co., 8z F. Supp. 906, 908 (D. Alaska 194.9) ; Hinchcliffe Motors Inc. v. WillysOverland Motors, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 580 (D. Mass. 1939) ; Hedrick v. Canadian Pacific
Ry. Co., 28 F. Supp. 257 (S.D. Ohio 1939). For a discussion of the difficulties raised
by a categorical application of rules such as the Erie rule, see, Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 CoLum. L. REV. 6o5, 6o8, 61o (19o8); Hynes v. New York Central
R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 235, 131 N.E. 898, 900 (1g92). Admittedly, the "'substan-

tive' shades off by imperceptible degrees into the 'procedural' and the 'line' between them
does not 'exist,' to be discovered merely by logic and analysis, but is rather to be drawn
so as best to carry out" the functions of the forum without undue hindrance or inconvenience. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J.
333, 343 (1933) ; Tunks, Categorizationand Federalism: "Substance" and "Prccedure"
After Erie Railroad v. Tonpkins, 34 ILL. L, REV. 271 (1939).
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A fundamental policy consideration underlying the substance-procedure rule is that the perhaps fortfiitous availability of a federal court
should not enable a litigant to achieve there a "substantially different
result" from that which would be reached in the state courtsY Applying this criterion to the question at hand, it could be argued that state
law should test the amenability of a foreign corporation to process, since,
if federal law were applied, the local plaintiff would be receiving relief
unavailable to him in his state court.'
Counterbalancing this analysis, however is the argument that even
the prospect of a litigant's achieving a "different result" should not
justify an obstruction to the orderly operation of federal courts by
application of state law.' 9 The federal definition of "doing business"
is generally thought to be determinative of the service of process issue in
cases where the district court jurisdiction rests on a federal question.20
If such is the case, a decision that state definitions should apply in diversity cases would give rise to a serious administrative problem. In an
1 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 556 (-949) 5 Woods v.

Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 538 (i949)5 Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer &
Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 532 (949); Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 191
(1947) 5 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 326 U.S. 99, 1o (1945).
" The Court in the Riverbank case purported to apply the decisional law of Illinois
in rendering its opinion. See Bull & Co. v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co., 344 Ill. ix, 175
Booz v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., z5o Ill. 376, 95 N.E. 460 (i91i).
N.E. 837 (93i)
Were the Riverbank case to come up today in Illinois, the decision would be different
because of ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 104 § 104.017 (1955). This statute provides, inter alia,
for service upon any "person" regardless of his citizenship if any business is transacted
within the state. This liberal trend "is sufficiently established so that its general adoption seems to be but a matter of time." Comment, 5o Nw. U.L. REV. 425, 431, (1955).
See: MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 88, § 92 (i95i) 5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (effective
July s, 1957)i VT. STAT. tit. 9, c. 72 § i562 (1947). Compare discussion in note 9
supra.
10 If a particular issue is greatly enmeshed with the innerworkings of the federal
courts, its rules, functions, and purposes, the court ought not be required to depart substantially from its rules of procedure and should be allowed, in such cases, to determine
its own jurisdiction without being impeded by state law. See Stephenson v. Grand
Trunk Western R.R. Co., iio F.2d 401 ( 7 th Cir. 194o).
2' It seems apparent that "when enforcing state rights in diversity cases, a federal
court acts as a state court; but when enforcing a federal right, it may be independent
of state rules." Note, 59 HARV. L. REv. 966, 972 (1946) ; Note, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
494, 520 (1949). See also: Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 461 (1955) (concurring opinion) i Freres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135, 142 (1950); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 33z U.S.
301, 305 (1947)5 Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (945); Jerome v.
United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943); D'oench, Dubme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 456 (1942) 5 Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
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action wherein the jurisdictional statement in the complaint alleged both
diversity and a federal question, the district court would be compelled
to pass on the merits of the latter allegation prematurely in order to
determine which test of "doing business" is applicable.
In addition, a federal venue statute2 ' is perhaps relevant to this
consideration in so far as it provides that, for venue purposes, a "corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is ... doing
business." Obviously, to determine whether a corporation is "doing
business" for purposes of the federal venue statute, the federal test
would be applied."
If, then, state law is invoked to determine the
validity of a district court's service of process on foreign corporations,
instances would arise where that court would lack jurisdiction, when, at
the same time, its venue would be proper-despite the fact that both
venue and jurisdiction would be dependent on the same factor. It has
been urged that the particular venue statute and the general operation
of federal courts would be better served if this irregularity were eliminated.23
It appears, then, that neither line of decision is without some surface
appeal. Of the two, however, the argument supporting the application
of state law, depending as it does on the "different result" analysis,
seems somewhat less satisfactory. That the plaintiff in Riverbank,
assuming his claim were valid, could get relief in any state court in
which jurisdiction over the defendant could be acquired would indicate
21 ,"A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated
or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded
as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes." 6z STAT. 935 (1948), 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1952). In Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 5x6 (S.D.N.Y. 1949),
the court stated that § 1391 (c) enlarged both the vulnerability of foreign corporations
to suit in the federal courts and their opportunities of access to such courts. See Hadden
v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., xo5 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Ohio 1952). Contra, Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Iowa z9'o). See
also HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 959

(-9s3).
22

That state law cannot control the venue of federal courts, see Mississippi Pub.
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) i Steel Motor Service, Inc. v. Zalke, zxz
F.2d 856, 858 (6th Cir. 1954); McCoy v. Saler, 205 F.2d 498, 499 ( 3 d Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 872 (1953); State Public School Bldg. Authority v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 127 F. Supp. 902, 9o4 (D. Pa. c955).
23 This irregularity has been criticized as leading to "a developing confusion result-

ing from a uniform federal interpretation of 'doing business' for purposes of venue
existing alongside of 48 varying interpretations of what is sufficient doing business to permit service of process." Barrett, Venue and Service of Process in the Federal CourtsSuggestions for Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 6o8, 619 (954).
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that his substantive cause of action was not at all affected by the fact
that no such personal jurisdiction was available in the Illinois courts.
This, in turn, suggests that the issue of the district court's personal jurisdiction is actually unrelated to the body of facts which together comprise
plaintiff's right to relief.2" From this it follows that application by the
federal court of its own "doing business" test would not, then, in any
way add to the legal right asserted by plaintiff. Rather, it would only
serve to enable the district court to enforce that right against this defendant. That the "result would differ" from the result to be anticipated in a similar action in the state court is only superficially relevant,
since the "different result" derives only from the broader personal jurisdiction of the district court, and not from an alteration of plaintiff's
substantive right to relief. Such a change in result does not appear to
contravene the policy underlying Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins.
Decisions like Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 25 elaborating on this
policy, are probably not inconsistent with the above analysis. 20 There,
a state statute closed the Mississippi courts to any foreign corporation
doing business in Mississippi without appointing a resident agent for
service of process. Plaintiff, a foreign corporation which had made no
such appointment, brought suit in the Mississippi federal district court
against a resident of the state, for breach of contract. 'The United States
Supreme Court, reversing the court of appeals, held that, since no right
24 "Jurisdiction," as the term is used in the context of this substance-procedure embroglio, is hardly involved with the operative facts which compose a plaintiff's cause
of action, as are other factors such as burden of proof and presumptions [Cities Service
Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 2o8, 212 (1939)], conflict of laws [Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (940)], contributory negligence [Palmer v.

Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 217 (1943)], and the statute of limitations [Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, io (945)], all of which are generally determined by re-

course to state law, regardless of whether they are considered matters of procedure or
substance. See SULLIVAN, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, § ioo5 at 341 (949).
22337 U.S. 535 (-949).

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), held that a
state's conditioning of a stockholder's personal suit against a corporation upon his posting
of a bond was a valid exercise of the plenary power of a state, and could not "be disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device." Id. at 556. Ragan v. Mer20

chants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949), held that the state statute of

limitations governed in a federal suit based on diversity of citizenship, since ". . .that
cause of action is created by local law." Id. at 533. In Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S.
283 (1947), a Virginia resident was denied recovery for a deficiency judgment in the
North Carolina courts because a state statute flatly barred such actions. Subsequently,
asserting diversity of citizenship he attempted to sue on the same claim in a federal
district court. The Supreme Court held that he could not recover, since a ". . .federal
court . . .cannot give that which [a state court] has withheld." Id. at 192.
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of action could be asserted by this plaintiff in the Mississippi courts, the
federal courts, under Erie, were similarly disabled from giving relief.
But the viability, locally, of the right asserted by the plaintiff in Woods
was substantially less than that of the plaintiff in Riverbank. While in
Woods the right itself survived, the Mississippi statute deprived the
state courts of jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiff's cause
of action, pointedly indicating the state's policy against enforcing that
"right." In Riverbank, on the other hand, the right is fully enforceablei the state courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter, but lack
jurisdiction over the defendant. For the federal court to give relief
in the Woods case would plainly interfere with an avowed state policy;
but there would be no such interference if the district court were to
assert jurisdiction in Riverbank. Furthermore, if, in a Woods situation,
the defendant were a resident of the state whose courts are closed to
the plaintiff, the federal district court might be the only tribunal in
which the plaintiff could serve the defendant with process. It would be
a dear violation of the Erie rationale to allow the plaintiff to enforce a
state right of action in a federal court when there might be no other
court in the country to which he could resort.
Taking into account the venue statute, the possible administrative
difficulties which could arise if the "doing business" test were different
in diversity and federal question cases, and the apparently limited
validity of the arguments supporting an application of state law, the
better disposition of the Riverbank case would probably be to apply the
federal "doing business" test.
RONALD M.
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